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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States justice system creates a presumption of innocence for
an accused in a criminal trial. However, this presumption is shamefully
weakened when a prosecutor is allowed to admit evidence of other criminal
conduct for which the defendant had been acquitted in a prior action. On
January 10, 1990, the United States Supreme Court, in a six-to-three
decision, specifically addressed this issue in Dowling v. United States.1 The
Court focused on two major questions: First, whether the admission of
evidence of other criminal conduct of which a defendant has been acquitted
in a prior action violates the collateral estoppel component of the fifth
amendment double jeopardy clause; and second, whether the introduction of
such evidence violates the due process test of "fundamental fairness." 2 The
Dowling Court held that the admission of evidence under Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b) did not violate the collateral estoppel doctrine and that the
evidence was not fundamentally unfair. This holding is contradictory to the
practices in many state courts3 and rejects strong policy rationales for
excluding such evidence. This Comment will show that the Court erred in
allowing the admission of prior criminal conduct for which the defendant had
been acquitted. Additionally, this Comment will argue that an absolute
exclusion is needed for this type of evidence.
In Part II, this Comment will review Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
and its application by the courts. Part III will discuss the doctrine of
collateral estoppel generally. Part IV will examine state and federal courts
that have addressed the problem of evidence from a prior acquittal. Part V
will explain the facts of the Dowling case and its holding. Part VI will
explore the reasons for creating an absolute exclusion for prior criminal
conduct evidence after an acquittal.
1 110 S. Ct. 668 (1990). This decision resolved a conflict among the courts of
appeals. Prior to Dowling, the circuit courts took a number of approaches in admitting
evidence of prior criminal conduct for which the defendant had been acquitted. See
generally United States v. Phillips, 401 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1968) (holding the prejudicial
effect of the evidence necessarily outweighs its probative value); United States v. Citro,
853 F.2d 1055 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel to determine
the admissibility).
2 Dowling v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 668 (1990).
3 See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
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II. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 404(b)
At common law, evidence which tended to show that the accused was
guilty of other criminal conduct was not admissible in a subsequent trial to
show the commission of the particular crime charged.4 Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b) adopted this rule and found evidence of prior crimes
inadmissible for purposes of showing the bad character of the defendant.5
Specifically, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) states that "[e]vidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show action in conformity therewith."6 However, the Rule
permits this type of evidence "for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident." 7 These exceptions create a loophole in the general
exclusionary rule, and have been "characterized as the 'Prosecutor's
Delight,' for it seems that few cases will arise in which the prosecutor will
be unable to link evidence of prior acts to such nebulous material
propositions."' However, the exceptions were deemed necessary due to the
difficulty in proving these material propositions with direct evidence? Also,
one state court has stated: "[N]o man can by multiplying crimes diminish the
volume of testimony against him."' 10 Therefore, courts allow the use of this
type of circumstantial evidence.
Once the prosecutor is able to link the evidence of the prior act "to such
nebulous material propositions,"1 the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule
404(b) states, a "determination must be made whether the danger of undue
prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence in view of the
availability of other means of proof and other factors appropriate for making
decisions of this kind under Rule 403. "12 Rule 403 allows relevant evidence
to be excluded only "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
' United States v. Fawcett, 115 F.2d 764, 768 (3d Cir. 1940).
5 FED. R. EvID. 404(b). See also Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948);
United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973).
6 FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
7 1d.
8 Comment, Exclusion of Prior Acquittals: An Attack on the Prosecutor's Delight, 21
UCLA L. REv. 892, 896 (1974).
' Comment, supra note 8, at 897. See also United States v. Castro-Castro, 464 F.2d
336, 337 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973).
10 State v. Hopkins, 68 Mont. 504, 510, 219 P. 1106, 1108 (1923).
t Comment, supra note 8, at 896.
12 FED. R. EViD. 404(b) advisory committee's note.
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danger of unfair prejudice [or] confusion of the issues ... "13 Yet, major
problems exist when using the Rule 403 balancing approach for Rule 404(b)
evidence.
First, the balancing test lacks firm discernible guidelines for its
application, and therefore, any appellate review is frequently unsatis-
factory.14 If a trial judge is impartial in balancing, appellate review is
relatively meaningless, for there will rarely be any abuse of discretion upon
which to base a reversal.15 Yet time has shown that trial judges infrequently
exclude the prior criminal conduct, based on the "overriding policy of
presenting all relevant evidence to the jury . "..."16 Because the question
of admissibility is a discretionary decision for the trial judge, appellate
reversal is practically nonexistent.
Second, the effective use of the limiting jury instruction to diminish the
prejudicial effect of the evidence is questionable to doubtful." One
commentator noted that "[o]nce such evidence is before the jury the
damaging prejudicial effect cannot be wiped out by subsequent limitation."18
Moreover, empirical evidence shows a positive correlation between the
admission into evidence of prior criminal acts and the likelihood of
conviction. Indeed, "[i]n one study, it was found thatjurors in criminal cases
involving similar charges and similar evidence convicted 27 percent more
often when informed of a prior conviction . . . than where there was no
criminal record." 9 Further, some of the statistics indicate that prospective
jurors do not care whether the criminal record consists of a conviction or an
acquittal, "for it is still a criminal record and thus its owner is an
13 FED. R. EviD. 403 (emphasis added).




6 Note, Expanding Double Jeopardy: Collateral Estoppel and the Evidentiary Use of
Prior Crimes of Which the Defendant Has Been Acquitted, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 511,
523 (1974).
17 See infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text for an expanded discussion on this
issue.
18 Comment, supra note 8, at 913. See also People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 200, 93
N.E.2d 637, 639 (1950).
19 Comment, supra note 8, at 910. See also H. KALVEN & H. ZEISL, THE AMERIcAN
JuRY 160, 179 (1970).
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undesirable."' As a consequence, the damaging prejudicial effect cannot
be wiped out effectively by a limiting jury instruction.
The final problem concerns the method of admitting similar act
evidence. In United States v. Huddleston,21 the United States Supreme
-Court held that it is not necessary for the trial judge to make a preliminary
finding that the prosecutor has proven the prior act by a preponderance of the
evidence.' However, the Court further explained that to prevent the
prosecutor from "parad[ing] past the jury a litany of potentially prejudicial
similar acts," the evidence must be relevant.' Yet, "'[r]elevancy is not an
inherent characteristic of any item of evidence but exists only as a relation
between an item of evidence and a matter properly provable in the case."'24
In the Rule 404(b) context, prior criminal conduct evidence is only relevant
when "the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the
defendant was the actor."' However, this low standard of proof actually
provides the skillful prosecutor with a virtually free hand in presenting
prejudicial evidence to the jury.
The combination of these three factors demonstrates the need for
additional protection for defendants who have been acquitted of the prior
criminal conduct. Regardless of whether the defendant has an opportunity to
prove his prior acquittal,' the damage occurs when the evidence is
presented to the jury.27 Therefore, many federal and state courts have
developed safeguards to protect further the rights of defendants acquitted of
prior criminal conduct.
20 Comment, supra note 8, at 910. See also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE REPORT: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME
IN A FREE SOcIETY 75 (1967); Schwartz & Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10
Soc. PROB. 133, 136 (1962).
21 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
2ld. at 689.
23 Id.
24 Id. (quoting FED. R. EviD. 401 advisory committee's note).
' Id. Prior to Huddleston, the standard of proof was a divisive issue for the lower
federal courts. See generally United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1979)
(clear and convincing evidence required); United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th
Cir. 1978) (preponderanceof the evidence required); United States v. Delohn, 638 F.2d
1048 (7th Cir. 1981) (only certain exceptions required clear and convincing evidence
before admission).
26 See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
21 Dowling v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 668, 679 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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III. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
The fifth amendment provides in part: "No person shall be ... subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ."I
The double jeopardy clause embodies three separate guarantees: "It prohibits
against a second prosecution after acquittal, against a second prosecution
after conviction, and against multiple punishments for the same offense."'29
The United States Supreme Court, in the landmark case Ashe v. Swenson,"3
explained the significance of the double jeopardy clause. The Court stated
that the double jeopardy clause incorporates collateral estoppel as a
constitutional requirement." Collateral estoppel simply means "that when
an issue of ultimate fact once has been determined by a valid and final
judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in a
future lawsuit. "32 In Ashe, the Court applied the collateral estoppel doctrine
to reverse a conviction when there was just one issue in dispute that had been
decided in the prior acquittal. 3 The Court noted that when a previous
judgment of acquittal was based upon a general verdict,' the court must
examine the record of the prior proceeding and conclude whether a rational
jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the
defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration. Ashe significantly
expanded a criminal defendant's protection under Rule 404(b) by prohibiting
the introduction of prior criminal conduct evidence when the issue was
decided in the prior judgment. However, the Court did not further address
whether the collateral estoppel doctrine mandated the absolute exclusion of
evidence from a prior acquittal at the current trial, regardless of whether the
issue was necessarily decided in the prior action. This topic will be
explored in Parts IV, V, and VI of this Comment.
28 U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
29 United States v. Crispino, 568 F. Supp. 1525, 1528 (D.N.J. 1984). See also linois
v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415 (1980); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717
(1969); United States v.eEngle, 458 F.2d 1021, 1025 (6th Cir. 1972).
30 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
31 Id.
32 Id. at 443.
33 Id. at 436.
31 A general verdict is "[a] verdict whereby the jury find either for the plaintiff or for
the defendant in general terms; the ordinary form of a verdict." BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 1560 (6th ed. 1990).
3- Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444-45.
36 E. IMWlNKELREID, UNCHARGED MIscoNDucr EviD. § 10:03, at 8 (1984).
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IV. FEDERAL AND STATE COURT DECISIONS
Nearly every jurisdiction, both in federal and state courts, has addressed
the problem of the admissibility of evidence of prior criminal conduct for
which the defendant has been acquitted. 7 The various jurisdictions have
approached the problem differently and four basic lines of cases have ensued.
First, some jurisdictions never admit the evidence under the rationale that the
prejudicial effect of such evidence necessarily outweighs its probative
value." This is a per se exclusionary rule because the evidence will never
be admitted under Rule 403 (or state equivalent) balancing.39 Second, other
courts also apply an absolute exclusion, holding such evidence inadmissible
due to fundamental fairness.' Third, a majority of courts appear to apply
a Rule 403 balancing test, without a per se exclusionary rule.4 1 This
approach is similar to the first approach, except that the prejudicial effect
does not necessarily outweigh the probative value. Finally, some courts
combine the collateral estoppel doctrine with a Rule 403 balancing test.
42
"I See infra notes 38-71 and accompanying text. See also Annotation, Admissibility
of Evidence as to Other Offense as Affected by Defendant's Acquittal of that Offense, 25
A.L.R.4th 934-76 (1983).
3 See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text. See also State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295,
350 P.2d 756 (1960); State v. Holman, 611 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn. 1981).
9 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text. See also State v. Perkins, 349 So.
2d 161 (Fla. 1977); State v. Wakefield, 278 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 1979).
41 See infra notes 56-64 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Van
Cleave, 599 F.2d 954 (10th Cir. 1979); Ex parte Bayne, 375 So. 2d 1239 (Ala. 1979);
Ladd v. State, 568 P.2d 960 (Alaska 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 928 (1978); People
v. Follette, 74 Cal. App. 178, 240 P. 502 (1925); State v. Sunclades, 305 N.W.2d 491
(Iowa 1981); Bingham v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 737, 215 S.W.2d 845 (1948); People
v. Oliphant, 399 Mich. 472, 250 N.W.2d 443 (1976); State v. Cooksey, 499 S.W.2d 485
(Mo. 1973); Williams v. State, 118 Neb. 281, 224 N.W. 286 (1929); State v. Zainsky,
143 N.J. Super. 35, 362 A.2d 611 (1976), aff'd, 75 N.J. 101, 380 A.2d 685 (1977);
State v. Heaton, 56 N.D. 357, 217 N.W. 531 (1927); Patterson v. State, 96 Ohio St. 90,
117 N.E. 169 (1917); State v. Smith, 271 Or. 294, 532 P.2d 9 (1975); Commonwealth
v. Manuszak, 155 Pa. Super. 309, 38 A.2d 355 (1944); State v. Houston, 17 S.C.L. (1
Bail.) 300 (1829); State v. Feela, 101 Wis. 2d 249, 304 N.W.2d 152 (Ct. App. 1981).
See also Annotation, supra note 37, at 943-54.
42 See infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text. See also Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S.
436 (1970); United States v. Citron, 853 F.2d 1055 (2d Cir. 1988); Crooker v. United
States, 620 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1980).
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In State v. Little,43 the Supreme Court of Arizona adopted the first line
of cases. In Little, the court held that the prejudicial effect of admitting
evidence of prior criminal conduct for which the defendant had been
acquitted necessarily outweighed its probative value." Although the court
recognized that this evidence had probative value, the court found that the
acquittal tended to reduce the probative value of the evidence, thus tipping
the scale toward inadmissibility.45 Specifically, the court stated that "the
relevance of the evidence of the prior offense depends upon the court's or
jury's drawing . . . inferences, thus lessening the probative weight of such
evidence . . . ."I The Supreme Court of Tennessee also precluded the
admission of evidence from a prior acquittal and expanded on the concept of
jury inferences. In State v. Holman,47 the Tennessee court found that: "For
such evidence to have any relevance or use in the case on trial, the jury
would have to infer that, despite the acquittal, the defendant nevertheless was
guilty of the prior crime."" The court further explained that no such
inference could be properly drawn from an acquittal, especially when the
acquittal was "based on insufficient evidence to sustain a guilty verdict."49
Even though the Arizona and Tennessee courts have adopted a per se
exclusionary rule, only a minority of courts have taken this view.
The second line of cases also applies a per se exclusionary rule for
evidence of prior criminal conduct for which the defendant has been
acquitted. Two state supreme courts have held, on the grounds of
fundamental fairness, that such evidence is never admissible.' Although
Florida courts have taken various approaches to evidence from prior
acquittals, the Florida Supreme Court, in a 1977 decision, stated that it is
fundamentally unfair to a defendant to admit evidence of acquitted crimes."
The court explained that "to the extent that evidence of the acquitted crime
tends to prove that it was indeed committed, the defendant is forced to
reestablish a defense against it."52 Therefore, the court held that evidence
87 Ariz. 295, 350 P.2d 756 (1960).
44 Id. at 307, 350 P.2d at 763.
41 Id. at 307, 350 P.2d at 764.
46 Id.
47 611 S.W.2d 411 (Tenn. 1981).
48 Id. at 413.
49 Id.
so See generally State v. Perkins, 349 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1977); State v. Wakefield, 278
N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 1979).
"' Perkins, 349 So. 2d at 163.
2 Id.
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of such crimes is not admissible in a subsequent trial.53 The Supreme Court
of Minnesota also championed this view in State v. Wakefield.-4 The court
declared:
[I]t is a basic tenant of our jurisprudence that once the state has mustered
its evidence against a defendant and failed, the matter is done. In the eyes
of the law the acquitted defendant is to be treated as an innocent and in
the interests of fairness and finality made no more to answer for his
alleged crime. It is our view that the admission into a trial of evidence of
crimes of which the defendant has been acquitted prejudices and burdens
the defendant in contravention of this basic principle and is fundamentally
unfair. Therefore, we conclude that under no circumstances is evidence
of a crime other than that for which a defendant is on trial admissible
when the defendant has been acquitted of that crime. 55
This minority view powerfully explains the strong policy reasons for
adopting a per se exclusionary rule.
In yet another approach, courts have determined the admissibility of
evidence of prior criminal conduct by employing a balancing test-the
probative value of the evidence versus the prejudicial effect to the
defendant-without regard to collateral estoppel.56 These courts find that
otherwise relevant and admissible evidence is not rendered inadmissible by
the fact that the defendant was previously acquitted, although the prior
acquittal is relevant to the trial court's relevance analysis;57 the acquittal
tends to diminish the probative value of the evidence, and the trial judge
should factor the acquittal in the balancing test.5" However, for the many
courts that adhere to this view, the balance is usually found to weigh in favor
of the probative value, and hence, the evidence is admitted.59 The Supreme
Court of Michigan expressed this view in the rape case of People v.
53 Id.
s 278 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 1979).
55 Id. at 308-09.
s See supra note 41.
7 See E. IMWINKELREID, supra note 36, § 10:06, at 12. See also Bray, Evidence of
Prior Uncharged Offenses and the Growth of Constitutional Restrictions, 28 U. MIAMI
L. RaV. 489, 515 n.106 (1974); United States v. Smith, 446 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Bussey, 432 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (dictum).
1s See E. TMWInKLREID, supra note 36, § 10:06, at 12. See also United States v.
Smith, 446 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1971).
" Annotation, supra note 37, at 943.
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Oliphant.' The court held that when the complainant and defendant
substantially agreed except for the key issue of consent, testimony of three
witnesses who testified that they had been raped by the defendant under
similar circumstances could be found to have sufficient probative value to
outweigh the prejudicial effect. 1 The court went on to state that such
evidence was offered in this case to show scheme, plan, and system and not
to convict the defendant of previous rapes. 2 Therefore, double jeopardy and
collateral estoppel did not apply.' 3 In the past, most state courts and some
federal courts have championed this view.'
However, many courts have begun to apply a combination of Rule 403
balancing with the collateral estoppel doctrine to the subsequent use of
evidence of prior criminal conduct of which the defendant has been
acquitted.' These courts do not automatically exclude evidence of a prior
act because of an acquittal. Rather, these courts bar the evidence whenever
its admission violates collateral estoppel or when the probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.
The courts that have adopted this approach usually read the United States
Supreme Court decision in Ashe v. Swenson' liberally.67 For collateral
estoppel to bar the subsequent use of prior acquittal evidence, two factors
must exist: First, the cases must involve the same sovereign;6 and second,
the defendant must demonstrate that the first acquittal verdict rested on the
trier-of-fact's conclusion that the defendant was in fact innocent.' If the
first trial ended a general verdict, the defendant may have an impossible task
to make that demonstration unless the issue in question was the only element
1399 Mich. 472, 250 N.W.2d 443 (1976).
61 Id. at 473, 250 N.W.2d at 446.
62 Id. at 472, 250 N.W.2d at 446 (the defendant was acquitted of all three rape
charges).
63 Id. at 473, 250 N.W.2d at 443.
" See supra note 41.
6S See supra note 42.
66 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
67 See E. IMVWILREID, supra note 36, § 10:05, at 10. See also Sabin v. Israel, 554
F. Supp. 390, 391 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
61 See generally Crooker v. United States, 620 F.2d 313, 313-14 (1st Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 857 (1980); United States v. Smith, 446 F.2d 200, 202 (4th Cir. 1971).
The following is an illustration of the same sovereign principle: If the acquittal occurs
in a state trial and the current prosecution is a federal case, or vice versa, the doctrine
of collateral estoppel will not bar the evidence. E. IMWINKELREID, supra note 36, §
10:05, at 10.
" See generally United States v. Johnson, 697 F.2d 735, 740 (6th Cir. 1983).
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in dispute in the prior offense.7' Additionally, some courts have required
the additional burden that the defendant prove the acquittal necessarily rested
on that conclusion.7'
The United States Supreme Court followed this last approach in
Dowling. Further, the Court provided some guidance for the proper
application and administration of this dual test-collateral estoppel and
balancing. However, by basing its analysis on a hypertechnical view of an
acquittal, the Court essentially disregarded the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
V. DOWLING V. UNITED STATES
A. The Facts
On July 8, 1985, a man wearing a ski mask and carrying a small gun
robbed a bank in Frederiksted, St. Croix, Virgin Islands.' The robber ran
from the bank and "commandeered" a passing taxi. 3 While driving away
from the scene, the robber pulled off his mask.74 An eyewitness observed
the robber removing his mask and at trial identified the man as Reuben
Dowling.75 Other witnesses testified that they had seen Dowling driving the
hijacked taxi around the streets of Frederiksted shortly after the bank
robbery.76
At the trial for the bank robbery, the prosecution sought to introduce the
testimony of Vena Henry. Henry stated that a similarly masked and armed
Dowling and an accomplice, Delroy Christian, entered her home two weeks
after the bank robbery.' She testified further that in an ensuing struggle,
70 See generally Hernandez v. United States, 370 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1966). See also
E. ImwnKELRID, supra note 36, § 10:05, at 11; Comment, Impeachment of the
Criminal Defendant by Prior Acquittals-Beyond the Bounds of Reason, 17 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 561, 582 (1981).
71 See E. IMWInKELREID, supra note 36, § 10:05, at 11. See also United States v.
Patterson, 827 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Boldin, 818 F.2d 771 (11th
Cir. 1987); United States v. Gentile, 816 F.2d 1157 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Johnson, 697 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Medina, 563 F. Supp. 979
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); State v. Paradis, 106 Idaho 117, 676 P.2d 31 (1983), cert. denied, 468
U.S. 1220 (1984).





77 Id. at 669.
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she unmasked Dowling." Dowling's defense in the first action did not
dispute his identity or his association with Christian, but claimed that he and
Christian had come to Henry's home to retrieve money rightfully belonging
to him.79 The jury acquitted Dowling in the Henry case.'
The prosecution sought to introduce this testimony to help establish
identity in the bank robbery trial. Dowling's identity was proven by showing
similar attire (mask and small gun) and his association with Christian, who
was spotted in the vicinity of the bank immediately prior to the robbery.81
The prosecution theorized that Christian was driving the intended getaway
car and his chance encounter with the police-who did not know a bank
robbery was taking place-frightened him away.'
Despite Dowling's acquittal in the Henry case, the United States District
Court of the Virgin Islands (St. Croix) admitted the testimony at the bank
robbery trial, but instructed the jury on the limited purpose for which the
testimony had been admitted.' The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that the prosecution was collaterally estopped by the acquittal from using
Henry's testimony.' Relying on previous Third Circuit decisions, the court
stated that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars "the evidentiary use of
crimes for which the defendant has been acquitted."85 However, in this
particular case, the court held that the admission of the Henry testimony was
harmless error, and therefore, the conviction was upheld. 6
B. The Court's Holding
In a six-to-three decision, the United States Supreme Court allowed the
admission of the Henry testimony. Specifically, the Court held that the
admission of the evidence did not violate the collateral estoppel component
of the double jeopardy clause nor was the evidence fundamentally unfair.
78 Id. at 670.
71 Id. at 674.




84 United States v. Dowling, 855 F.2d 114, 122 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 493 U.S. 342
(1990).
8- Id. at 121 (citing United States v. Keller, 624 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1980)).
6 Id. at 124.
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C. The Court's Reasoning
1. Collateral Estoppel
In Dowling, the Court began its analysis by reviewing and defining the
doctrine of collateral estoppel' and then applying the fact pattern to that
definition. The Court presented two fundamental reasons for declining to
extend the collateral estoppel doctrine to this particular case. First, the Court
focused on the different standards of proof required in both actions. 8 Then,
the Court looked to whether the issue was necessarily decided in the prior
action.89
a. Standard of Proof
The Court began by holding that "an acquittal in a criminal case does
not preclude the Government from relitigating an issue when it is presented
in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of proof. "' The Court
based this decision on prior cases that "supported" this proposition.9
In United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,' Patrick Mulcahey
was indicted on federal charges of knowingly engaging in the business of
dealing in firearms without a license.' Mulcahey admitted that he had no
license to deal in firearms.' In his defense, however, he claimed that he
had been entrapped into making the illegal transactions.95 The jury returned
a verdict of not guilty.' Following his acquittal of the criminal charges, the
prosecutor instituted an in rem action for the forfeiture of the seized
firearms.' The Court held that Mulcahey's acquittal on criminal charges
did not estop the Government from proving in a civil action that the firearms
should be forfeited.98 The Court reasoned that "the jury verdict in the
7 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
88 See infra notes 90-109 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
9 Dowling v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 668, 669 (1990).
9' Id. at 672.
2 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
9' Id. This was in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1).




98 Id. at 356-57.
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criminal action did not negate the possibility that a preponderance of the
evidence could show that Mulcahey was engaged in an unlicensed firearms
business."' Therefore, the Court concluded that the difference in relative
burdens of proof in the criminal and civil actions precluded the application
of the collateral estoppel doctrine.
The Court also precluded the application of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel in One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States."° In Emerald
Cut Stones, Francisco Klementova entered the United States without
declaring to United States Customs one lot of emerald cut stones and one
ring. 101 Klementova was tried and acquitted of charges of smuggling the
articles into the United States without submitting to the required customs
procedures." ° Following his acquittal, the Government instituted an in rem
action for the forfeiture of the articles."°6 Klementova argued that his prior
acquittal on the criminal charges barred the forfeiture action."°4 The
Supreme Court disagreed. The Court found that the "acquittal of the criminal
charges may have only represented 'an adjudication that the proof was not
sufficient to overcome all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.""'1 5
But as to the issues raised in the forfeiture action, "it does not constitute an
adjudication on the preponderance-of-the-evidence burden applicable in civil
proceedings."106
Indeed, both the Firearms and Emerald Cut Stones decisions recognized
the importance that the subsequent action was civil in nature. The Court
allowed the evidence to be admitted "partly because the clearly lower
standard of proof in the subsequent civil proceeding and partly because the
later proceeding was remedial rather than punitive in nature." 0 7 The Court
explicitly stated in Firearms that "[u]nless the forfeiture sanction was
intended as punishment, so that the proceeding is essentially criminal in
character, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not applicable." ' 8 In Emerald
99 Id. at 354.
100 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (per curiam).
101 Id. at 232-33.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 233.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 235 (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938)).
I6 Id. See also Murphy v. United States, 272 U.S. 630 (1926); Stone v. United States,
167 U.S. 178 (1897).
11 United States v. Crispino, 586 F. Supp. 1525, 1533 (D.N.J. 1984) (interpreting
One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (per curiam)).
108 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 362.
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Cut Stones, the Court also emphasized that "[i]f for no other reason, the
forfeiture is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment because it involves neither two criminal trials nor two criminal
punishments." 9 In Dowling, both actions involved criminal trials and
criminal punishments. Hence, the Dowling Court's reliance on the Firearms
and Emerald Cut Stones decisions is unjustified and its rationale for doing so
is at best attenuated.
b. Issue Necessarily Decided
In Dowling, the Court did not end its analysis of collateral estoppel by
focusing solely on the varying standards of proof. Rather, the Court stated
that even if the lower burden of proof at the second proceeding did not serve
to avoid the collateral estoppel component of the double jeopardy clause, the
evidence, nevertheless, was admissible. The Court reasoned that Dowling
had failed to demonstrate that his acquittal in the first proceeding represented
a jury determination that he was not one of the men who entered Henry's
home.11 The Court found numerous grounds upon which the jury could
have based its acquittal in the prior action (in fact, the identity of Dowling
was not at all at issue in the first case), and thus the prosecution was not
collaterally estopped from introducing the evidence.11 The Court
distinguished Ashe because, there, the issue in the second case had been
necessarily decided in the defendant's favor in the first case. 12 Whereas,
in Dowling, the Court held that the issues of Dowling's identity and
association with Christian had not been necessarily decided in the defendant's
favor in the prior criminal action.1  However, the Dowling Court seemed
to forget the approach required in ascertaining whether an issue has been
necessarily decided. In Ashe, the Court previously had stated:
The federal decisions have made clear that the rule of collateral estoppel
in criminal cases is not to be applied with the hypertechnical and archaic
approach of a 19th century pleading book, but with realism and rationality
.... The inquiry must be set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye
to all the circumstances of the proceedings. Any test more technically
109 Emerald Cut Stones, 409 U.S. at 235.
110 Dowling v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 668, 673 (1990).
11, Id. at 672.
112 Id.
"I Id. at 673.
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restrictive would, of course, simply amount to a rejection of the rule of
collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings .... 114
Yet, in Dowling, the Court based its holding on a hypertechnical view of an
acquittal. 115
2. Fundamental Fairness
The Court finally addressed whether admitting the evidence violated the
due process test of "fundamental fairness." In addition to protection against
double jeopardy, the fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be.
* . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...
"1 6 The Dowling Court recognized that the introduction of evidence in
this circumstance had the potential to prejudice the jury and to unfairly force
the defendant to spend time and money relitigating issues that may have been
determined in the defendant's favor in the first trial.117 However, the Court
stated that the question "is whether it is acceptable to deal with the potential
for abuse through nonconstitutional sources like the Federal Rules of
Evidence, or whether the introduction of this type of evidence is so
extremely unfair that its admission violates 'fundamental conceptions of
justice."'" The Court then noted that only actions that offend those
"'fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and
political institutions,' and which define 'the community's sense of fair play
and decency"' violate the due process test of fundamental fairness." 9
In light of the limiting instructions provided by the trial judge, the Court
felt that the testimony was not fundamentally unfair. The Court reasoned
that: a) the jury was free to assess the truthfulness and significance of the
testimony;"2 b) the trial court's authority to exclude potentially prejudicial
evidence adequately addressed the possibility that introduction of such
evidence would create a risk that the jury would convict a defendant based
on inferences drawn from the acquitted conduct;"' c) inconsistent verdicts
14 Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970) (citations omitted).
115 Dowling, 110 S. Ct. at 680 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116 U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
... Dowling, 110 S. Ct. at 674.
118 Id.
19 Id. (quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935); Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952)).
,
20 Id. at 349.
121 Id.
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are constitutionally permitted;" and d) the tradition that the prosecution
may not force a person acquitted in one trial to defend against the same
accusation in a subsequent proceeding is amply protected by the double
jeopardy clause and collateral estoppel." z Relying on these four policies,
the Court did not find a violation of fundamental fairness.
VI. NEED FOR ABSOLUTE EXCLUSION
By allowing the admission of evidence of prior criminal conduct for
which the defendant has been acquitted, the criminal justice system fails to
treat the acquitted defendant as innocent. In Dowling, the Court permitted the
prosecution to continue forcing the acquitted defendant to answer for his
prior alleged criminal acts. Instead, the Court should have placed an absolute
bar on the subsequent use of evidence from a prior acquittal for a number of
reasons.
First, the admission of evidence concerning a prior acquittal requires the
defendant to relitigate facts from the previous case at a lower standard of
proof. In Huddleston, the Court allowed the introduction of similar act
evidence when "the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and
that the defendant was the actor."" Yet, whenever a defendant is forced
to relitigate facts from a prior action, there is a strong "risk that the jury
erroneously will decide that he is guilty of that offense. " " That risk is
heightened when the jury is allowed to conclude that the defendant committed
the prior offense under a lower standard of proof.1' Justice Brennan stated,
in dissent, that facts relating to the prior offense, used only as evidence of
another crime, do "not reduce the burden on the defendant; he is still
required to defend against the prior charges." 27 Ironically, under the
majority's reasoning, a prosecutor may be able "to rely on a prior criminal
offense (despite an acquittal) as evidence in a trial for an offense which is
part of the same transaction as the prior offense. " " In fact, the
Government may force the defendant to relitigate these facts in trial after
trial." 9 Finally, under the majority's reasoning, evidence from a prior
1= Id.
123 Id.
124 United States v. Huddleston, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988).
125 Dowling, 110 S. Ct. at 679 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 680 (emphasis in original).
129 Id.
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acquittal may be used to enhance a defendant's sentence under a sentencing
scheme that requires a lower standard of proof. 1 ° Surely, the Court should
find these situations to be offensive to the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Second, many courts that permit the evidence of prior criminal conduct
do not allow the defendant to inform the jury of his prior acquittal.
These courts base this decision on several basic theories: a) the evidence of
the acquittal itself is not relevant to the present case;132 b) the jury should
not be confused by the additional information of an acquittal which could
mislead them into believing that the defendant absolutely did not commit the
prior similar acts; 3 and c) the Federal Rules of Evidence except from the
operation of the hearsay rule only judgments of conviction, not judgments of
acquittal."' By preventing the defendant from informing the trier of fact
of his prior acquittal, a court essentially disregards the innocence of the
defendant.
Third, there should be an absolute bar on evidence from a prior acquittal
because a court runs the risk that the jury will convict the defendant based
on his prior criminal conduct. 35 One lower federal court has stated:
One of the dangers inherent in the admission of extrinsic offense evidence
is that the jury may convict the defendant not for the offense charged but
for the extrinsic evidence. This danger is particularly great where ... the
extrinsic activity was not the subject of a conviction; the jury may feel the
defendant should be punished for that activity even if he is not guilty of the
offense charged. 136
Hence, a jury may find the accused innocent of the present charge, yet want
to convict the accused because they feel the accused was guilty of the prior
acquitted charge. Thus, the inherently prejudicial nature of such evidence
130 Id.
"' See United States v. Jones, 808 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1006 (1987); United States v. Viserto, 596 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1979); State v. Feela, 101
Wis. 2d 249, 304 N.W.2d 152 (Ct. App. 1981); People v. Bolden, 98 Mich. App. 452,
296 N.W.2d 613 (1980).
132 Feela, 101 Wis. 2d at 264, 304 N.W.2d at 159.
' Bolden, 98 Mich. App. at 461, 296 N.W.2d at 617.
114 Viserto, 596 F.2d at 537.
135 Yet, a state may not punish a person for his character; the state may only
criminalize anti-social acts. See E. IMWRNKELREID, supra note 36, § 1:03, at 5.
16 United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
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increases the risk that the jury erroneously will convict the defendant of the
present charge.
Finally, fundamental fairness mandates the exclusion of evidence of
prior criminal conduct for which the defendant has been acquitted. In
Dowling, the Court placed too much credence in the "effective" use of jury
limiting instructions under Federal Rule of Evidence 106. There is no
guarantee that a jury will not draw the inference that the defendant is a "bad"
person or has the propensity for criminal conduct.13 Indeed, the evidence
unquestionably tends to prove the defendant's character, and the jury may
succumb to the "he did it once before syndrome."138 In his classic work,
Convicting the Innocent,39 Professor Borchard examined the cases of sixty-
five wrongfully convicted defendants. He found that at many of the
defendants' trials, the introduction of their prior criminal conduct was "fatal"
to their case.1" The evidence "inspired" a "prejudice . . . in the minds of
the jury."141 A more recent study found that juries are twenty-seven
percent more likely to convict a defendant when informed of his prior
criminal conduct."
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court failed to recognize important policy considerations
when it decided Dowling. Not only did the Court misapply prior
doctrine,4  the Court also forgot the importance of an acquittal."4 The
Court should have looked to the real purpose for excluding prejudicial
evidence:
137 FED. R. EviD 403.
138 See Note, Limiting the Use of Prior Bad Act and Convictions to Impeach the
Defendant-Witness, 45 ALB. L. REV. 1099, 1104 (1981).
139 E. BORCHARD, CONvICrING THE INNOCENT (1932).
140 E. BORCHARD, supra note 139, at xvi. See also Jones, Convicting the
Innocent-Revisited: A Remedy Afforded by Federal Rule 609, 38 Mo. B.J. 168
(April-May 1982).
141 E. BORCHARD, supra note 139, at xvi. See also Jones, supra note 140, at 168;
Reed, Admission of Other Criminal Act Evidence After Adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 53 U. CN. L. REV. 113 (1984).
142 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. See generally supra notes 17-20 and
accompanying text.
143 See supra notes 90-115 and accompanying text.
144 See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982) (stating that the double jeopardy
clause attaches "great weight" to an acquittal). See also United States V. DiFrancesco,
449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980).
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"It may almost be said that it is because of this indubitable Relevance of
such evidence that it is excluded. It is objectionable, not because it has no
appreciable probative value, but because it has too much. The natural and
inevitable tendency of the tribunal-whether judge or jury-is to give
excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited, and either
to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge, or to take the proof
of it as justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of the present
charge."
145
When a defendant is acquitted of a prior crime, he should "be treated as an
innocent and in the interests of fairness and finality made no more to answer
for his alleged crime."" The approach taken by the Supreme Court in
Dowling is simply repugnant to the concepts of due process and double
jeopardy. An absolute exclusion would better serve the interests of society
and the policies underlying the United States Constitution. It is commonly
said that a defendant in a criminal case is presumed innocent until proven
guilty. However, by admitting evidence from a prior acquittal, the defendant
is no longer treated as an innocent. Rather, the acquitted defendant must
continue to answer for his prior alleged crime.
Craig L. Crawford
14I State v. Little, 87 Ariz. 295, 306, 350 P.2d 756, 763 (1960) (quoting 1 1.
WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 194 (3d ed. 1939)).
146 State v. Wakefield, 278 N.W.2d 307, 308 (Minn. 1979).
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